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This article discusses the significant impact of the two crucial moments in Indonesia namely, the 1965 coup and
reformasi (reformation) in May 1998 and the impact towards the Indonesia-Malaysia relationship. History had
demonstrated that both events were followed by some changes in the bilateral relationship. The 1965 coup for
instance resulted the fall of Sukarno and the collapse of PKI, while reformasi brought the fall of Suharto and the
collapse of New Order. However, it was undeniable that the demands of international situation especially during
and after the Cold War were significant factor in driving of those events.
Keywords: The 1965 coup; reformasi; domestic politics; Cold War; Indonesia-Malaysia relationsIntroduction
Some researchers have attempted to understand the
extent to which the consequence of the two “special” mo-
ments, namely the 1965 coup and reformasi (reformation)
in Indonesian politics. Edward V. Schneier argued that
reformasi produced political transformation in Indonesia
such as the end of “communism threat,” a new legislature,
and the shifted of executive-legislative relations (Edward
2009). While, James H. Cassing argued that after the 1965
coup and the collapse of Sukarno, Suharto became syn-
onymous with power and authority, mistrusted political
competition and openness, and blaming these for the
chaos of the Sukarno era (Cassing 2000). Both events
impacted to the political scenario in Indonesian domestic
politics notably in the regime changes. In the reformasi for
instance, Suharto and his military regime collapsed after
the huge mass demonstrations by university students,
while the 1965 coup was an occurrence of regime trans-
formation from Sukarno to Suharto. The coup 1965
was an abortive coup that ended with the tragic tragedy
where many Indonesian people were killed, notably the
members of Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis
Indonesia, PKI) the largest communist party in the world.* Correspondence: amaksum@gmail.com
Centre for Policy Research and International Studies (CenPRIS), Universiti
Sains Malaysia, Penang 11800, Malaysia
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reproduction in any medium, provided the origBoth events also had a significant impact on the
Indonesia-Malaysia relations due to the interplay of do-
mestic politics in the two countries. This is because the
emergence of two political factions in Indonesia and
Malaysia, namely “pro” and “anti” government which
indirectly influenced the relationship between the “two
countries.” Thus, we offer two crucial questions regarding
to what extent the factors and consequences of both
events affect Indonesia-Malaysia relations. First, what both
events meant for the development of Indonesia-Malaysia
relations? Second, what are the factors, internally and
externally, leading to the events? This article attempts to
elaborate and answer these questions.Indonesia, Malaysia, and international politics
According to Amitav Acharya, during the Cold War era,
“the vast majority of the world's conflicts occurred in the
Third World and most of these conflicts were intra-state
in nature (anti-regime insurrections, civil wars, tribal con-
flicts etc.) (Acharya 1995).” Otherwise, the conflicts and
stability in the Third World’s domestic politics are also
responsible to the regional stability and also contribute to
the discord with neighbours (Acharya 1995:5). We argue
that the roles of the domestic politics in Southeast Asia’s
international relations were stimulated by the superpower
engagement in the Cold War era. It was reasonable be-
cause “the superpower intervention in the Third Worldr. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
mmons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
inal work is properly cited.
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contributed to order and stability in the Third World
(Acharya 1995:8).” In contrast to this, the involvement of
great powers after the end of the Cold decreased, the role of
domestic levels increased. This is because the international
environment had changed when the communist-capitalist
issue has been replaced by new issues namely globalisation.
Kenneth N. Waltz argued that in the post-Cold War era
the so-called structural realism is still relevant (Waltz
2000). Specifically, Waltz argued that,” international polit-
ics is being transformed and realism is being rendered
obsolete as democracy extends its sway, as interdepend-
ence tightens its grip, and as institutions smooth the way
to peace (Waltz 2000:6).” The Waltz’s statement indi-
cated that international structure affected states interest
and behaviours (Mearsheimer 2007; Glaser 2003; Waltz
1979). However, it needs to be emphasized that the role
of domestic politics gives an impact to states foreign re-
lations. Because, according to Robert Jervis, “a country’s
foreign policy reflects the nature of its domestic regime
(Jervis 2006; Zakaria 1992; Sterling-Folker 2002).” The
behaviours of Sukarno and Suharto during their adminis-
tration corresponded with their foreign policies and of
course with this theory.
The above concept regarding the role of domestic pol-
itics and the international system totally concurred with
Gideon Rose’s concept about the role of international
structure. According to Gideon Rose, international struc-
ture will effect only in a certain condition, whether in “low
pressure” or “high pressure (Rose 1998).” High pressure
means that states find it difficult to create foreign policy
due to the high pressure from international structure in
terms of international environment, alliance resolve, eco-
nomic interdependence, and regionalism (Maksum 2011)a.
By contrast, in the low pressure, states are free to conduct
foreign policy (Rose 1998:152). We believe that those events
have correlation with international situation and the com-
plexity of domestic politics at the same time. The emergence
of the 1965 coup and reformasi totally had been influenced
by the dynamics of international politics. Furthermore, both
events had implications for both Indonesian domestic polit-
ics and Indonesia-Malaysia bilateral relations. In the next
section the 1965 Coup and Reformasi 1998 and its conse-
quences upon Indonesia-Malaysia relations will be analyzed.
The 1965 coup and the fall of Sukarno
The background of the 1965 coup
Until recently, the speculation and the research regarding
the mystery of the 1965 coup had been difficult to explain,
particularly the main actors behind the coup. Some
scholars like Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey of
Cornell University were involved in serious research soon
after the coup (Roosa 2008). They were unable to finish
the research because of limited resources and cooperationfrom the Indonesian military government. Fortunately,
years later the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released
documents and facts which made researchers more
optimistic about the prospect of this research (Roosa
2008:27).
It was undeniable that the United States (US) played a
crucial role behind the 1965 coup. Former Indonesian
Ambassador to Cuba, A. M. Hanafi said that “CIA has
been working long time ago since the Republic was
founded, indeed (FORUM Keadilan 1999).” Thus, it was
a long process and many conspirators were involved in
the 1965 coup. In the Cold War era, Indonesia received
special attention of the great powers (the US and its
allies) because of the huge influence of Indonesian
Communist Party (PKI) at the high levels of Indonesian
government as well as at the grass root. Meanwhile, at the
international level there emerged what the scholars call
“three polar” namely, the US, Soviet Union, and China.
This international situation significantly gave an impact to
PKI members in the Indonesian government. After the
split of Sino-Soviet relations, PKI members were prone to
look at China as a better friend rather than Soviet Union
though they obtained full support in securing West Irian
(currently known as Papua Province).
The situation in Indonesia becomes a dilemma to
communist bloc. This is because the communist’s pow-
ers (Soviet Union and China) regarded to PKI as the lar-
gest communist party in the world. However Indonesia
was also under US and capitalist threat. Moreover, the
split of Sino-Soviet relations affected Indonesia-Soviet
relations because of Indonesian failure to repay the So-
viet Union's military loans of about one billion dollars.
The loan allocated by Soviet Union was assist to Indone-
sia’s military operation to takeover West Irian from
the Dutch. To China, this situation was a good oppor-
tunity to make an approach to Indonesia by supporting
konfrontasi (confrontation) against Malaysia in 1963 and
gave approximately, USD 50 billion and allocated about
USD 100 billion to establish a rival organisation of
United Nations (UN) namely, NEFOS (Newly Emerging
Forces) where the financial aid would be received in
1966 (Chua 2001).
The complexity of Sino-Soviet relations regarding the
situation in Indonesia was utilized by US government to
infiltrate into Indonesian domestic politics scenario. One
of the important US operations is to stop financial assist-
ance to Indonesia. To the contrary, the aid to Indonesian
Army (TNI-AD)b significantly increased. The US authority
argued:
The only US aid we are now going to Indonesia
consist of funds to pay for military training. We feel
such training is in our interest because it helps to tie
us closer to Indonesia military leaders who may well
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political orientation of the country.
The President interrupted to say that all US military
assistance going to Indonesia is being provided
because it is our national interest, not theirs. He
hopes that those present would make this point clear
(Harsutejo 2003).
In the meantime, the US was pessimistic towards
Indonesia because they failed in their approaches to Su-
karno. The US had attempted to approach Sukarno
through some economic assistance. They proposed such
regional forums such as Association of Southeast Asia
(ASA) and the South-East Asia Friendship and Economic
Treaty (SEAFET) (Liow 2005). However, all those attempts
were opposed by Sukarno (Liow 2005:83–86). The US was
forced to utilize his residual aid as persuasive levers which
did not work due to Sukarno’s pride use in his retort “go
to hell with your aid (Chua 2001:26).”
The US was worried about Indonesia because of the
growing of the communists and its good prospects in
the future along with its rich natural resources at the
same time (Roosa 2008:16-17). Richard M. Nixon con-
vinced that “with its 100 million people, and its 3,000-mile
arc of islands containing the region's richest hoard of nat-
ural resources, Indonesia constitutes by far the greatest
prize in the Southeast Asian area (Nixon 1967).” Hence,
the US government had attempted to take strategic actions
in handling Indonesia to prevent a takeover by communist
groups. John Roosa argued that “from 1958 to 1965 the
United States had trained, funded, advised, and supplied
the army which could be designed as a state within a state
(Roosa 2008:252).” The US government via the National
Security Council (NSC) argued that “the civil power in the
non-communist parties under support of the Army could
turn against the communist party in the political arena
(Roosa 2008:257).”
At the grassroots level, there had existed “sentiment”
and tension between communist groups and Islamic
groups due to the endorsement of the Land Regulations
(Undang-Undang Pokok Agraria, UUPA) by Indonesian
government which was perceived as a victory to PKI.
The PKI member’s disrespect towards Islamic religion
became a significant factor to the emergence of the ten-
sions. At the highest level of Indonesian politics there
emerged the tension because of the rise of the issue of
Dewan Jenderal (General Council) which was suspected
to attempt a coup against Sukarno's government. The
Dewan Jenderal issue became serious after it was uncov-
ered the “Gilchrist Document” at the British Embassy in
Jakarta (Roosa 2008:300 & Soebandrio 2001:18-19).
Moreover, the issues of the establishment of Angkatan
ke V (the Fifth Forces) and the armament support fromChina were creating a tension between PKI and the
Army (TNI-AD). The PKI-TNI/AD tensions were more
complicated after a broadcast was made that President
Sukarno was sick and probably would die. Those situa-
tions emerged because of the provocation by the US and
through some news agency such as the British Broadcast-
ing Centre (BBC), Reuters, Radio Malaysia, Radio Australia
and the Voice of America (VOA) (Roosa 2008:250–290).
In October 1st, 1965, the 1965 coup, a tragic tragedy
occurred and many Indonesian people particularly those
suspected as communist activists were killed. After-
wards, in the early 1966 several scholars were involved
in serious research regarding the actual number of the
victims of the massacre. Stanley Karnow of Washington
Post said that the victims are about 500,000 in Java and
Bali, while S. King of New York Times noted in May
1966 that about 300,000 people were killed (Roosa
2008:30). A Fact Finding Commission that was estab-
lished by President Sukarno announced that 78,000 were
killed. Indonesian former President Abdurrahman
Wahid said that 500,000 PKI activists were killed by Is-
lamic groups. However, Noam Chomsky's analysis based
upon the facts released by CIA found that 250,000
people were killed. Robert Cribb also recorded in his re-
search “The Indonesian Killings, 1965–1966: Studies
from Java and Bali” mentioned that between 150,000
and 2 million people were killed (Cribb 1990:8-12).
The 1965 coup and konfrontasi
The konfrontasi of Indonesia against Malaysia in 1963
could be considered an important factor that led to the
occurrence of the 1965 coup. It was because this policy
was not totally supported by all Indonesian. The kon-
frontasi is unilateral policy had created by Sukarno and
supported by PKI. Many Indonesian military opposed
the konfrontasi policy particularly those who came from
TNI-AD military officers. The confused political situation
was used by such individuals in Indonesian army as the
anti-Sukarno groups to take an initiative to launch efforts
to end the konfrontasi. Secretly, several Indonesian Army
officers attempted to contact Malaysian authority or some
Indonesian suspects (in Sukarno’s view) in Malaysia
and Singapore such as General Benny Murdani, Des
Alwi, Jan Walandow, and Prof. Sumitro Joyohadikusumo
who were involved in PRRI/Permesta rebellion in West
Sumatra.d According to Des Alwi who was a key figure in
the “approach” with Malaysia, the first mission failed
under Syarnubi Said and Sukendro to consolidate with
Ghazali Shafie of Malaysia under the initiative of General
Ahmad Yani (Othman et al. 2009). Concurrently, in
Indonesia occurred the 1965 coup where General Ahmad
Yani as the Chief of Indonesian Army, was kidnapped and
murdered together with other six generals of Indonesian
military and a first lieutenant. The consolidation with
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Indonesian elements focused on the 1965 coup. Finally,
both countries reached an agreement in 1966 after Adam
Malik of Indonesia and Tun Abdul Razak of Malaysia met
in Bangkok, Thailand. At the same time after the ending of
konfrontasi, both countries along with Thailand, Singapore,
and the Philippines agreed to establish the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967.
The 1965 coup and konfrontasi: from systemic factors to
Indonesian domestic politics
Based on the above discussions regarding the coup 1965,
it can be established firstly, the Cold War situation had
influenced the political configuration in Indonesia. The
Sukarno policy to build diplomatic relations with com-
munist bloc rather than capitalist bloc had affected the
Indonesian domestic politics which also influence the
foreign relations. The PKI itself faced a dilemma because
of the split of Sino-Soviet relations that indirectly influ-
enced the Soviet Union behaviour towards Indonesia.
The Soviet Union-Indonesia relations during konfrontasi
cooled down (Chua 2001:26). Secondly, the Sukarno’s
konfrontasi against Malaysia was not totally supported
by internal groups particularly the Indonesian army
(TNI-AD). This situation was used by the US to create
the anti-Sukarno groups among the Indonesian Army.
The intelligence operations under the CIA of the US,
the Military Intelligence-Section 5 (MI5) of Britain, and
Indonesian army intelligence were behind the 1965 coup
and the collapse of PKI. Thirdly, the provocation of mass
media towards Indonesia through the BBC, Radio Malaysia,
Radio Australia and the VOA also played a key role (Easter
2001 & Roosa 2008:250–290).
It became clear that the Cold War situation leading to
the rivalry between Soviet Union-US was a key factor in
the 1965 coup. Furthermore, the real involvement of
external powers through an intelligence operation had
complicated the situation in Indonesian domestic polit-
ics particularly before the 1965 coup. It demonstrated
that international structure in the Cold War was a deter-
minant of the occurrence of the 1965 coup that brought
an end to PKI existence in Indonesia.
The 1965 coup and the reconciliation of relationship
Although the 1965 coup in Indonesia was a tragedy for
Indonesia, it benefited Malaysia because it paved the way
for reconciliation and normalize the relationship. The fall
of Sukarno and succeeded by Suharto along with his mili-
tary regime were a guarantee to the normalization of rela-
tionship because the Suharto administration was totally
under capitalist bloc. Not surprisingly after the 1965 coup,
two parties have similar characteristics particularly at
the leadership level and the domestic politics after the
collapse of PKI in Indonesia. Before konfrontasi Suhartohas demonstrated a commitment to build the harmony
of Indonesia-Malaysia relations. The arrival of the peace
mission to Kuala Lumpur was the evidence that Suharto
seriously wanted to end the konfrontasi with Malaysia.
It was interesting to note that the 1965 coup had pro-
duced an implication towards the complexity of domestic
politics in the two countries. The complexity politics be-
tween the United Malays National Organization (UMNO)
and the opposition groups, particularly with Pan-Malaysia
Islamic Party (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, PAS) were signifi-
cant. During konfrontasi Dr. Burhanuddin of PAS took op-
posite position by supporting Indonesia. Dr. Burhanuddin
opposed the establishment of Malaysia and supported
Azahari’s rebellion in Brunei. Under Dr. Burhanuddin,
PAS was closer to PKI in Indonesia and also supported
the Malayan communist party (Parti Komunis Malaya,
PKM) in order to challenge UMNO (Adam 1996). Two
political factions also emerged in Indonesia during
konfrontasi namely, pro-konfrontasi and anti-konfrontasi.
Pro-konfrontasi encompasses Sukarno, nationalists, and
PKI. While the anti-konfrontasi groups such as Indonesian
Army (TNI-AD) and Islamic groups (Masjumi Party,
Nahdlatul Ulama [NU] Party and sympathizers). During
konfrontasi TNI-AD established a contact with Malaysian
government and Indonesia citizens in Malay Peninsula and
Singapore.
The 1965 coup and the rise of Suharto as Indonesian
President significantly influenced the political changes
in the both countries. In securing his power, Suharto
and his military regime under the US support created a
strategy to established GOLKAR party. Afterwards, the
trans-party relations between GOLKAR of Indonesia
and UMNO of Malaysia became the main instrument of
Indonesia-Malaysia stable relations (UMNO-Online.com
2011)e. The 1965 coup not only paved the way for the
Indonesia-Malaysia reconciliation, but also led to an end
to konfrontasi and developed regional stability. The 1967
peace agreement held in Bangkok, Thailand, paved a new
era of Indonesia-Malaysia relationship. Under this agree-
ment both countries agreed to begin various cooperation
such as social, economy, politics, and security.
The most significant achievement of the Indonesia-
Malaysia relationship after the 1965 coup was the mass
migration of Indonesian people to Malaysia in order to
“support” Malayan political existences (Liow 2003). Since
that time, the relations between both countries was
harmonious. Many observers argued that under the Tun
Razak leadership both countries enjoyed “special rela-
tionship (Hara 2008).”
Reformasi and the fall of Suharto
The rise of reformasi
At the end of Suharto era, he was facing a similar situ-
ation compared to the Sukarno era. The occurrence of
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Indonesian people to urge national political transformation.
The Suharto regime was viewed as authoritarian and un-
democratic and should be replaced by a new democratic
government. In addition, the rise of globalisation after the
end of the Cold War has strongly influenced this scenario.
Suharto’s regime urged to implement a clean government,
eradicate corruption, collusion, and nepotism. The three
political issues namely corruption, collusion, and nepotism
became a popular slogan at mass demonstrations and
posed a real challenge to the Suharto administration. This
phenomenon is considered quite acceptable and it has
proven what Samuel Huntington had envisaged about
“third wave of democratization” (Cabarello-Anthony 2005)
after the end of the Cold War.
The international situation in the post Cold War era
changed where the capitalist-communist issue became
an obsolete matter and was replaced by globalisation is-
sues. Globalisation brought a new issue which demanded
states to become more transparent and accountable.
Globalisation itself became popular after the end of the
Cold War and demanded states to be more liberal in
politics and economy. In terms of politics, globalisation
urged states to establish a democratic and stable govern-
ment. While in economic sector globalisation demanded
states to be more liberal and go for open market policies.
According to Waltz after the collapse of Soviet Union,
globalisation becomes a major issue that indirectly pro-
moted American values. Waltz argued that globalisation
was constructed as “made in America (Waltz 1999).” It
was because the US uses its political, economic and mili-
tary leverage to manipulate international events to pro-
mote its interests (Waltz 1999:51).
The emergence of reformasi began with the occur-
rence of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 that brought
to the rise of prices of basic needs. Demonstrations and
social movements emerged. The efforts of government
to overcome the crisis were no longer successful. The
tensions increased between demonstrators and the security
forces because the political responses from Suharto gave
slowly. The situation worsened after Indonesian security
forces took offensive action to deal with the demonstrators
and the level of violence inevitably increased.
Jakarta as the centre of reformasi movement became a
violent place and there were a lot of looting and dam-
aging of public facilities. It reached a peak in May 12th,
1998 when Suharto decided to step down and was suc-
ceeded by his Vice President, BJ Habibie. Previously, in the
campus of Universitas Trisakti in Jakarta, the security
forces had attacked demonstrators and some of them were
killed namely, Elang Mulya, Hafidin Royan, Hendriawan
Sie, Hery Hartanto. While the riots in Yogyakarta, Moses
Gatotkaca, a worker died in May 8, 1998 (Semanggi Peduli
2001-2003a)c. Some people have been lost, others arrestedor murdered, because Suharto continuously to use the
military action to deal with demonstration. Approximately,
fifteen demonstrators have been lost during 1997 to 2001
and until recently their existence were still questionable
(please see Semanggi Peduli 2001-2003b).
At the government level, BJ Habibie as a successor of
Suharto has to settle for some tasks such as ending the
dwi fungsi ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia,
Indonesian Armed Forces) (dual function of ABRI). The
dwi fungsi means that the role of Indonesian Armed Forces
not only in the security matter but also in the political and
business arena. The dwi fungsi is the Suharto's strategy to
securing his power in the parliament through the TNI/
POLRI (Kepolisian Republik Indonesia. Indonesian Police
Forces) committee (Fraksi TNI/POLRI). BJ Habibie urged
to organise a democratic election immediately in order to
establish a new democratic government. In addition, he
has to arrange some important policies like reformation of
mass media and urged to release some political prisoners
in the Suharto era where many among them have been
jailed since the 1965 coup (Habibie 2006). Actually, the
democratisation issue became a challenge to Suharto be-
cause the reformasi itself was supported by the US. To the
US, Indonesia has to reform and to be a more democratic
country so to match the regional situations (Hadiz 2004).
Globalisation as cause of reformasi
The reformasi was the event determined by several fac-
tors that emerged in 1998. Firstly, the end of the Cold
War with bipolar system followed by unipolar world and
the emerging of new issues namely globalisation. The
issues such as democracy, market liberalisations, and
clean governance directly affected Indonesian domestic
politics. Secondly, the pressure from the anti-Suharto
groups during reformasi movement had demonstrated
that international situation after the end of the Cold War
was a significant factor in creating difficult situations in
Indonesian domestic politics.
Overall, Suharto had to step down because he failed
to keep up with the changes in international level not-
ably globalisation and its consequences. The collapse of
Suharto was the real evidence that the 1997 financial cri-
sis is an international conspiracy which needed different
responses and actions. Furthermore, the difficult political
situations in Indonesia accompanied by financial crisis are
really influences on Indonesia’s relations with Malaysia.
This is because the Indonesian reformasi significantly influ-
enced the Malaysian domestic politics which seriously
challenged Mahathir's administration. This will be dis-
cussed in the next section.
The reformasi and the tension of relationship
The wave of reformasi followed by the resignation of
Suharto in Indonesia was not done a single factor in the
Maksum and Bustami SpringerPlus 2013, 3:45 Page 6 of 9
http://www.springerplus.com/content/3/1/45political transformation in Southeast Asia. Asian finan-
cial crisis and the “silent problems” among ASEAN
countries became significant factors in the mapping of the
political configuration in the region. However, the fall of
Suharto followed by reformasi in the various sectors like
liberalisation of mass media had significant affected the
Indonesia's foreign relations particularly with Malaysia.
The Anwar Ibrahim case became a source of the ten-
sion in Indonesia-Malaysia relations because of the
“interference” of Indonesian leaders in Malaysian domes-
tic affairs. The reformasi in Indonesia had been attrib-
uted to Anwar to create a similar situation in Malaysia.
However, he met the failure after was arrested by Malay-
sian police under Mahathir's authority. The fall of Su-
harto in Indonesia made Anwar more optimistic that he
could make a similar reformasi agenda in Malaysia.
Anwar was campaigning to fight against corruption,
cronyism, and nepotism in the UMNO General Assem-
bly in 1998. At the congress, Anwar planned to create
no-confidence votes among UMNO members against Dr
Mahathir (Sudin & Hussein 2002). The tension between
Anwar-Mahathir was triggered by Anwar's provocative
statement. In June 1998 Anwar said that “if we are un-
willing to accept [political reform], we may face the
Indonesian situation where people demanded changes”
(Felker 1999).
The tension became more complicated when ASEAN
leaders began to criticise Mahathir’s policy regarding the
arrest of Anwar Ibrahim. ASEAN leaders recognised that
the Anwar’s arrest is considered a human right abuse. BJ
Habibie as a new Indonesian leader and the Philippine
President Josef Estrada admitted sympathy to Anwar.
Both leaders agreed to cancel in participation in the
APEC general meeting to be held in Kuala Lumpur. Ab-
dullah Ahmad Badawi as the Minister of Foreign Affairs
gave a response promptly by saying that “if they will
cancel, it will not be decreasing the ASEAN voices in
the forum (Gatra 1998).” Afterwards, Abdurrahman
Wahid (Gus Dur) as the fourth Indonesian President
had admitted a sympathy to his colleague, Anwar
Ibrahim. In his letter to Anwar, Gus Dur stated that,
“greetings from Indonesia, and remember that we are
behind your struggle. Remember that Allah is always
with us (Gatra 1999).”
Through the Foreign Minister, Syed Hamid Albar the
Malaysian government strongly opposed Gus Dur’s
statement. Besides that, the Malaysian government also
condemned Gus Dur because of his controversial state-
ment published in the Far Eastern Economic Review
(FEER). In December 9, 1999, FEER reported that,
“Mahathir asked Gus Dur to assist him to approach with
Israel.” However, Indonesian Foreign Minister Alwi
Shihab said that Gus Dur never gave such a statement
(Gatra 1999).The Malaysian government worried about Gus Dur’s
statement because this issue will impact to the UMNO’s
voters in Malaysian general election in 1999. Former
Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas emphasised that
Indonesia has to be careful in responding to the Malay-
sian domestic affairs. He described that the response of
Indonesia and the Philippine leaders towards Anwar
Ibrahim case as a personal sympathy and totally did not
reflects the foreign policy of both countries (Gatra
1998).
In general, the above discussion showed that reformasi
was influenced by the changes of Indonesia domestic
politics which affected the foreign relations with
Malaysia. Although the statements of BJ Habibie and
Gus Dur were based on a personal sympathy, however
they demonstrated that the bilateral relations had been
disturbed. Specifically former Malaysian Foreign Minis-
ter, Syed Hamid Albar reminded that since Suharto as
the Indonesian President, “the Indonesia-Malaysia rela-
tions were in harmony (ANTARA 2008).” The changes
in Indonesian domestic affairs were also affected by the
regional politics. The rivalry among ASEAN leaders was
a sensitive issue and it contradicted the ASEAN situ-
ation during the Cold War particularly under Suharto in
Indonesia.
The role of systemic
To Indonesians, the 1965 coup and the reformasi were
two events in different time, different situation, yet pro-
ducing a similar result, namely the fall of autocratic gov-
ernment. Both events gave an implication to the regional
politics where the 1965 coup paved the way for the
Southeast Asian capitalist countries to cooperate with
one another. The reformasi and the fall of Suharto led to
the vacuum of leader in ASEAN after three decades
under Indonesia and Suharto's dominant roles. It was
undeniable that the demands of international situation
were significant factor in driving of those events.
In the context of Indonesia-Malaysia relations both
events were put on the table at a crucial moment. These
events have interconnections and relatively occurred in
the similar time and situation. The 1965 coup for in-
stance, had close correlations with Malaysia and it really
emerged because of the major power’s grand strategy.
The Cold War situation was a determinant factor where
Indonesia and Malaysia gained a strong influence from
the major powers. Indonesia's close relations with com-
munist countries totally contradicted with the Malaysia’s
loyal policy towards the West. The British and the US as
the main ally of Malaysia worried over Indonesia be-
cause of the Sukarno’s hard line policy and he was really
un-cooperative.
Besides the US interest, the 1965 coup benefited
Malaysia as a gateway to make peace approaches to
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the 1965 coup could not have occurred. Both the US
and British had maximised their resources to interfere in
the Indonesian domestic politics, particularly to create
an “internal ally” in Indonesia. It was interesting to note
that Malaysian domestic politics divided into two blocs
namely pro-West and anti-West. Pro-West groups
namely UMNO and its sympathizers while anti-West/
pro-Indonesia groups encompasses PAS and PKM.
The ideological disputes between capitalist and com-
munist were the major factor of the occurrence of the
1965 coup. Indonesia was a major ally to Soviet Union
and since the split of Sino-Soviet relations Indonesia
built relations with China. Since independence, Malaysia
has strongly been under the West influence notably Brit-
ish which are also pro-capitalist and anti-communist.
The occurrence of the 1965 coup in Indonesia was the
victory to the US and the ally. It was because their mis-
sion to save Indonesia from communist influence be-
came successful. Not surprisingly ten days after the 1965
coup (coup occurred on October 1, 1965) New York
Times wrote that, “U.S. is heartened by red setback in
Indonesian coup (Roosa 2008:18–19).”
In the context of reformasi as a new event that oc-
curred after the end of the Cold War a further analysis
is possible. The occurrence of the Asian financial crisis
in 1997 was an important factor in determining of the
reformasi. However, the Asian financial crisis was the
factor among many factors that merged together to urge
Suharto to step down. The end of the Cold War
followed by new situations (globalisation) era became a
real challenge to Indonesian government. The new
agendas such as democracy, liberalisation of market,
transformation, and good governance had significant im-
plications to Indonesia. Observers argued that globalisa-
tion was a new phenomenon after the end of the Cold
War, however we agree with the Waltz’s argument that
globalisation is arguably made by American (Waltz
1999). It was reality that the end of the Cold War with
bipolar system followed by unipolar world remaining the
US alone as the major power in international structure.
The American superiority in the economics and over-
whelming military power, tremendously assist in main-
taining his survival in the unipolar world after the
collapse of Soviet Union. At least, since the end of the
Cold War until 2004, the U.S military expenditures were
more than six time greater than those of prospective ri-
vals such as Germany, Japan, France and Britain com-
bined, so that no other state or even combination of
states is capable to challenge and spread their influences,
except with the U.S assistance (Ikenberry et al. 2009).
In the meantime, the situation in Malaysia was quite
different compared with Indonesia where the Malaysian
government (Mahathir) and all the stake holders wereready to face “attack” from the opposition (Anwar Ibra-
him) and quite successful to survive in the crisis. Con-
versely, Suharto had to collapse because of the weakness
of his infrastructure rather than his personality. Suharto
finally had to move from his power after more than
thirty two years ruling his military regime. It is probably
different if the Cold War still exists because the major
powers would play involved in both countries for secur-
ity and strategic reasons. Because the Cold War ended
and the international situation changed, Indonesia and
Malaysia became less important to the major powers. In
the Cold War era, however the major powers were no-
ticeably involved in both countries because of the exist-
ence of Soviet Union along with the communist
agendas. During the Cold War era wherever the Soviet
Union and China were involved in some countries, the
US and the allies were also ready to compete and fight
against communism concurrently.
Conclusion
The 1965 coup and the reformasi, the two moments that
influence the Indonesia-Malaysia relationship was be-
cause these important events have interconnection with
Malaysian domestic politics. After the 1965 coup both
relationship dramatically changed because of the similar
characteristic between Indonesia and Malaysia. Both
countries have a similar agenda, vision and mission
which were determined by the involvement of major
powers in the Cold War arena. In contrast to this, refor-
masi that had affected Indonesia-Malaysia relations be-
cause of the lack in involvement of major powers and
the international situation has changed. In addition, the
similar characteristic between Suharto leadership style
and his counterpart in Malaysian significantly influenced
the harmonious relationship during the Presidency.
The split of domestic politics emerged in the both
countries before the 1965 coup and the reformasi oc-
curred. In the 1965 coup, Indonesian domestic politics
had splits into two groups namely anti-Sukarno (TNI-
AD and Islamic groups) versus pro-Sukarno (PKI and
sympathisers). While in Malaysia domestic politics had
splits into two political factions namely the anti-
Malaysia (PAS and PKM) versus the government
(UMNO and the British). In reformasi, Indonesian do-
mestic politics had separate into two elements namely
pro-new order (GOLKAR and TNI) challenged by anti-
Suharto groups encompassing university students,
scholars and the citizens. At the same time, the Malay-
sian domestic politics had split into two political groups,
namely pro-government encompassing UMNO and the
National Front (Barisan Nasional, BN) challenged by
anti-Mahathir groups such as Anwar Ibrahim, PAS, and
Democratic Action Party (DAP) under the Alternative
Front (Pakatan Rakyat, PR).
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of the Indonesia-Malaysia relations. The 1965 coup pro-
duces a new leadership in Indonesia along with new
paradigm which significantly influenced the close Indo-
nesia’s relations with Malaysia. In the context of refor-
masi in 1998, the changes of Indonesian leadership
influenced the Indonesian perspective towards Malaysia,
though not significantly. Furthermore, the 1965 coup oc-
curred in the bipolar era of the Cold War and on the
contrary reformasi occurred in the unipolar world with
the US as a single major power after the collapse of So-
viet Union. Thus, the rise and fall of international struc-
ture situations significantly impact the international
relations because Indonesia and Malaysia were the
“smaller countries.” Automatically both countries will be
affected by major power behaviours along with their
high capability in international structure.
Endnotes
aThe four elements are executed as international struc-
ture and have to be measured as determinant factor
to the states interest and behaviors. It adopted from
Maksum 2011.
bTNI-AD stand for Tentara Nasional Indonesia-
Angkatan Darat or Indonesian National Armed Forces-
the Army
cIt was also known as “Tragedi Semanggi [Semanggi
Tragedy] and the victims also called as “pahlawan refor-
masi [reformation heroes]” (Please see Semanggi Peduli
(2001-2003a) "Pahlawan Reformasi,” available in: http://
www.semanggipeduli.com/Pahlawan/pahlawan.html
(accessed 19 Jan 2010).
dSee Roosa (2008:265), PRRI (Pemerintahan Revolu-
sioner Republik Indonesia or Revolutionary Government
of the Republic of Indonesia); Permesta (Piagam Per-
juangan Semesta or Charter for Universal Struggle).
eAt the present time, both Golkar and UMNO still
built relationship even the Suharto had gone and Golkar
not occupy Indonesian government. Some of UMNO
leaders said that Golkar and UMNO has been work to-
gether since the early and continue to build a good co-
operation (UMNO-Online.com 2011).
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